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THE HAND IN THE BREW: JUDGES AND THEIR 
COMMUNITIES 
Thomas F. Burke & Lief H. Carter 
PAUL W. KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION (YALE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 256. HARDCOVER $45.00. 
 
DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, COMMON LAW JUDGING: SUBJECTIVITY, IMPARTIALITY, 
AND THE MAKING OF LAW (UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS 2016). PP. 
280. HARDCOVER $75.00. 
I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life. There, before us, is the brew. 
Not a judge on the bench but has had a hand in the making. 
—Benjamin N. Cardozo1 
 
Paul Kahn’s Making the Case and Doug Edlin’s Common Law Judging both address 
a fundamental conundrum.2 Law claims to generate correct and dispositive resolutions of 
disputes by resorting to principles that transcend the interests of both the parties in cases 
and the judges who decide them. Yet law is indeterminate, at least for a significant chunk 
of the cases that divide jurists in the appellate courts. Judges in such cases do not simply 
discover the law the way an explorer is said to discover an island; as Benjamin Cardozo’s 
quote above asserts, they create the law. But if judges create law, and if they disagree 
amongst themselves about what the best law should be, on what grounds can we say that 
a particular judge’s decision is principled and valid, worthy of our respect? Is it not simply 
a reflection of that judge’s worldview, or worse yet, the political party that brought him or 
her to office? 
Kahn and Edlin address this problem in radically different ways. Edlin’s book looks 
down on the matter from the Olympian heights of analytic philosophy. Kahn is writing 
from inside Cardozo’s brewery, trying to show law students how to be better producers—
and better readers—of legal opinions. What the two share is a determination to show that 
legal judgment should be understood not as the solving of a math problem nor merely an 
                                                          
 1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921). 
 2. PAUL KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION (2016); DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, 
COMMON LAW JUDGING: SUBJECTIVITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND THE MAKING OF LAW (2016). 
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exercise in power but something else: a relationship between judges and the community 
that evaluates the judgment. Kahn and Edlin understandably focus on the judge side of the 
relationship, but thinking through their books makes us wonder if they ought to have 
considered the community side as well. 
The backdrop for the Kahn and Edlin books is an array of intellectual developments 
that have utterly undermined the view of legal reasoning as the discovery of a pre-existing 
truth. As political scientists, we could of course give primacy to the long tradition of 
judicial behavior studies showing that rather than converging on “right answers” to legal 
questions, appellate judges of different political stripes regularly arrive at varying 
conclusions about the cases that come to them. But the matter seems much broader and 
deeper than that. Philosophical developments over the past hundred or so years have 
created a fascinating set of challenges for Anglo-American jurisprudence, highlighting the 
social construction of reality and undermining foundationalisms of all stripes. Not long 
before his death, Richard Rorty made the point in a lecture in Torino, Italy, when he 
addressed the conflict between Pope Benedict XVI’s fundamentalist vision of social order 
with his own philosophical tradition of pragmatism: 
There is no neutral court of appeal that will help us decide between these two 
accounts of the human situation, both of which have inspired many acts of moral 
heroism. In the pope’s vision, humans must remain faithful to what he calls “the 
common human experience of contact with a truth that is greater than we are.” In 
the relativist vision, there never was, and never will be, a truth that is greater than 
we are. The very idea of such a truth is a confusion of ideals with power.3 
With accelerating prominence in the twenty-first century, the model of humans as 
rational actors has also taken a hit. Daniel Kahneman and his late partner Amos Tversky 
have catalogued an immense array of cognitive illusions that are endemic to human 
reasoning. A human mind is, as Kahneman has put it, a machine for jumping to 
conclusions.4 Even more recently, Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach, in their book, The 
Knowledge Illusion, show that the things we think “we know” are just thoughts picked up 
and copied from friends, peer groups, popular culture, and so on.5 Recent fMRI brain 
studies suggest that the brain is, if anything, wired to reject reason and objectivity, to 
perceive new rational and evidence-based assertions proposed by others as a potential 
threat to one’s own security. Confronted with a tightly reasoned argument, our first 
reaction is to reject it and show it is wrong.6 None of this should surprise any careful 
observer of the political career of Donald Trump and of the tens of millions who continue 
to identify him, in spite of daily and overwhelming evidence to the contrary, as a great 
man come to drain our nation’s swamp and restore it to greatness. 
The implications of all this for jurisprudence are clear. Settling disputes justly so 
that they do not escalate into socially disruptive feuds seems to require independent and 
                                                          
 3. RICHARD RORTY, AN ETHICS FOR TODAY: FINDING COMMON GROUND BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND 
RELIGION 17 (2010). 
 4. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 79 (2011). 
 5. See STEVEN SLOMAN & PHILIP FERNBACH, THE KNOWLEDGE ILLUSION: WHY WE NEVER THINK ALONE 
16–18 (2017). 
 6. See HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON 328–33 (2017). 
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neutral third parties to decide which of the contending arguments, framed by applicable 
legal principles, is the correct and true one. What are we to do, though, if there is no such 
thing as a “correct and true outcome,” but instead many mutually inconsistent yet plausible 
and justifiable answers to the legal questions that come before judges? If justice does not 
consist of discovering what the law truly commands, just what have judges been doing all 
these centuries to maintain social approval and the appearance of objectivity? 
Edlin’s contribution toward answering these questions is modest: He tries to clear 
away some of the conceptual confusions he believes have clouded our understanding of 
legal judgment. Most of all he takes aim at the “objectivity/subjectivity” binary, the 
familiar trope in which judges are seen either as ruling according to some objective 
standards or merely imposing their own subjective wills.7 Wrapping ourselves up in 
worries about either objectivity or subjectivity, Edlin argues, is a dead end, because 
common law judging combines both objective and subjective elements. Instead we should 
be using a different set of concepts to understand legal judgments—individuality, 
impartiality, independence, and most of all, intersubjectivity.8 Because judges are people 
with life experience that bear on the cases before them, they necessarily draw on their own 
worldviews in forming legal judgments. But because law is a social practice, the judge’s 
legal conclusions are validated only when they are accepted through an intersubjective 
process by the legal community. Legal judgments, then, are claims about what that 
community considers valid, not the discovery of objective truths.9 
Much of Common Law Judging is a critique of the ways in which “objectivity” has 
been used and misused in claims about legal judgment. Chapter Two reviews the concepts 
of subjectivity, objectivity, and impartiality from a variety of perspectives, including the 
philosophy of language and various branches of legal theory.10 Edlin uses the example of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to examine how a judge’s personal experiences can, quite 
properly in his view, affect her legal judgments. In Chapter Three, the heart of the book, 
Edlin compares the “common law tradition of legal judgment” to Kant’s theory of aesthetic 
judgment.11 Edlin argues that legal judgments, like aesthetic judgments, are individual 
conclusions that require validation from some community. This makes legal judgments 
“intersubjective.”12 Chapter Four illustrates Edlin’s claims through an examination of the 
legal opinions in three cases.13 Chapter Five, somewhat of a tangent, argues that legislative 
efforts that stop judges from considering certain sources of law, or that regulate the types 
of evidence judges may consider, should be counted as attacks on judicial independence 
because they interfere with the judge’s reasoning process.14 In the concluding chapter, 
Edlin draws on a variety of examples, most prominently the dueling perspectives on 
affirmative action offered by Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Clarence Thomas, to 
                                                          
 7. EDLIN, supra note 2, at 19. 
 8. Id. at 7. 
 9. Id. at 10. 
 10. Id. at 20–51. 
 11. Id. at 54–63. 
 12. EDLIN, supra note 2, at 52–76. 
 13. Id. at 77–89. 
 14. Id. at 90–109. 
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illustrate his claims about subjectivity and intersubjectivity in legal judgment.15 
Although Common Law Judging is modest in its aims, it is wildly ambitious in its 
sweep. Edlin catalogs and summarizes for scholars hundreds of years of academic 
pondering about the key concepts he examines. Virtually every thinker articulating every 
angle on the subject gets in on the act, from Thomas Aquinas to Hans Zeisel, from Sir 
William Blackstone to Martin Shapiro, from Thomas Hobbes and David Hume to Roscoe 
Pound and Judge Richard Posner, to take just a few of the names listed in the six-page 
“index of names” at the end of the book. Indeed, if you love endnotes and citations, this 
book is for you: Of the book’s 262 pages, just 125 are text. The other 137 pages include 
the aforementioned index of names, a more general index, a list of references, and the 728 
endnotes Edlin has meticulously created. Many of the endnotes are deliciously meaty, and 
the conscientious reader will want to keep two bookmarks working at the same time. 
As our own writing on the subject attests,16 we are highly sympathetic to Edlin’s 
account of legal reasoning as an intersubjective process that cannot be understood by 
invoking either pure subjectivism or strong objectivity. Aesthetic judgment does seem a 
useful analogue in those respects. That said, legal reasoning has quite different and much 
more urgent social functions than reasoning about aesthetics. Legal reasoning is used to 
justify taking away people’s money, their reputations, even their lives, and to resolve 
disputes between parties that might otherwise disturb the peace of the whole community. 
As Robert Cover observed decades ago, law is founded in coercion and implicit threats of 
violence.17 Thus the study of legal reasoning seems to require close analysis of the process 
by which legal judgments are validated. But Edlin’s account sidesteps such analysis. Edlin 
tells us that whether a legal judgment is valid depends on its acceptance by “the 
community.”18 Fair enough, but that of course raises the question of what to do when “the 
community” is divided, as is often the case, for example, in American constitutional law. 
Indeed many of the overheated claims about objectivity and subjectivity in law that Edlin 
is criticizing arise precisely because there is so much division in the legal community. 
Take for instance Edlin’s analysis of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Thomas’s use of 
personal experience in the affirmative action cases. Sure, it is fine for them to draw on 
their personal experiences, but how exactly are we to decide which of them has made the 
better argument? Are both of their legal judgments valid because some part of “the 
community” has accepted them? Or are both invalid because neither has been accepted by 
the whole community? Because Edlin does not examine the building blocks of legal 
judgment, the modes of legal reasoning that ground the evaluations of legal community, 
he cannot generate any way to critically analyze worse and better legal arguments, so he 
cannot get inside the intersubjective process whose broad outlines he is describing. As a 
result, it is not clear exactly what counts as validation or acceptance in Edlin’s account. 
Edlin’s focus on the judge’s side of the intersubjective process obscures the work 
that “community” is doing in his account; it seems to presume a relatively unified and 
                                                          
 15. Id. at 115–22. 
 16. LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW (9th ed. 2016). 
 17. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT 
COVER 203–38 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995). 
 18. EDLIN, supra note 2, at 6. 
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healthy community for legal judgments. But what if such a community does not exist? 
What if the community validates legal judgments that fail to resolve social disputes, or that 
result in actions that are disastrous for society? This seems to be where the analogy to 
aesthetics breaks down, as the reception of legal judgments has consequences for the work 
that law and legal institutions do in society. In this respect Edlin’s book, for all its scholarly 
rigor, seems to raise more questions than it answers. 
Paul Kahn’s Making the Case starts where Edlin ends, with the claim that legal 
judgments are acts of persuasion rather than discovery.19 But Kahn does not take for 
granted, as Edlin’s account seems to, the functioning of this intersubjective process. It 
takes artistry, charisma, even a kind of magic, Kahn maintains, for judges to persuade 
others that their rulings are correct.20 And, he argues, many of them today do not seem to 
be up to the job.21 They write long opinions filled with citations and quotations, “as if 
writing an opinion has become a task of cutting and pasting.”22 The rise of word processing 
and the consequent ease of cut, copy, and paste may be the proximal causes here, but like 
Richard Posner,23 Kahn thinks a deeper, more troubling cause is at work: All this cutting 
and pasting, he says, “is more than likely a sign of judges who can no longer confidently 
respond to the accusation that their work is just politics in another form.”24 Kahn 
accordingly aims his book at law students, the next generation of judges, whom he fears 
are being miseducated about opinion-writing. Students, he says, read highly edited 
segments of cases that stress holdings, and so see them more as bundles of rules rather 
than as the works of rhetorical art they are.25 Kahn insists instead that to read a case 
opinion is to experience a performance—dicta and holding both matter!—and that students 
need to learn to appreciate what goes into both great and muddled performances.26 
Most of Making the Case is Kahn’s account of what a legal opinion must do if it is 
to be persuasive. Kahn illustrates this account through persuasive and unpersuasive 
opinions drawn from his specialty, constitutional law. In Chapter Two he argues that legal 
opinions must invoke a familiar “narrative,” a way of seeing the case that fits in with 
familiar themes.27 For example, in a case concerning violent video games, Supreme Court 
justices who contend that “the government often overreacts to the purported dangers of 
new media” are met with the theme that “scientific knowledge has led to better government 
regulation.”28 In Chapter Three he argues that judges must find in the constitutional 
provisions and statutes they interpret an “us,” a purpose for the law that the polity, we the 
people, share.29 Chapter Four considers the tension judges confront between, on one hand, 
the raw text of laws, statutes, and constitutions, and on the other hand, the body of case 
                                                          
 19. KAHN, supra note 2, at 1–18. 
 20. Id. at 12–13. 
 21. Id. at 11. 
 22. Id. 
 23. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 78–94 (2013). 
 24. KAHN, supra note 2, at 12. 
 25. Id. at 10–11. 
 26. Id. at xiv. 
 27. Id. at 18–45. 
 28. Id. at 31–32. 
 29. KAHN, supra note 2, at 46–87. 
5
Burke and Carter: The Hand in the Brew: Judges and Their Communities
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2017
BURKE-CARTER, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (213) (CORRECTED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2018  8:41 AM 
218 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:213] 
law and precedents that claim to interpret the texts.30 Chapter Five examines facts and how 
judges muster them.31 In the concluding chapter, Kahn argues for a humanistic, “inside” 
account of law as a balance to social, scientific, “outside” accounts that treat law merely 
as policymaking or an arena of political power.32 
This brief and pedestrian summary does Kahn’s book an injustice. He is a wonderful 
writer, passionate about the art of opinion-writing and the more mysterious elements of 
the judge’s performance. We found Kahn’s account of what makes for persuasive legal 
reasoning highly persuasive. That said, we wonder whether the problem of judicial 
persuasion as Kahn frames it can be solved simply through better opinion-writing. Aside 
from rhetorical skill, one requisite for persuasion is an audience that is capable of being 
persuaded, and it is not clear that the audience for American constitutional law still has 
this capacity. Laurence Tribe, the author of an eminent constitutional law textbook,33 
wrote in 2005 that he declined to produce a new edition of the book because he despaired 
that the typical techniques of legal analysis could integrate “the deep and thus far 
intractable divisions between wholly different ways of assessing truth and experiencing 
reality, divisions both cultural and religious in character” that embody contemporary 
constitutional law.34 The chasm within the community for constitutional law judgments 
is, of course, not just over the interpretation of particular doctrines but also the proper 
techniques of interpretation. Kahn chooses not to grapple with these divides. Although his 
approach is clearly at odds with many versions of originalism, for example, he does not 
acknowledge how contested it is. (Nor does he consider the big fight over his favored 
purpose-oriented approach to statutory interpretation.) So when Kahn argues that, for 
example, a Thomas opinion is not persuasive,35 we can imagine the response of Thomas 
and his sympathizers in the legal community: It is persuasive to us! As Thomas Keck’s 
Judicial Politics in Polarized Times demonstrates, the divides so evident in the American 
political community today are often reflected, rather than repaired, in our legal system.36 
To believe that legal judgments are objective, that judges divine the law through 
their legal expertise, that their worldviews and life experiences have nothing to do with 
their conclusions, requires a kind of faith that is mostly gone. The move to an 
intersubjective understanding of judging, though, requires a different kind of faith. One 
must believe that judges, through the power of their rhetoric, can bring an increasingly 
diverse and politically polarized community together. The extent to which this is true of 
the United States in 2017 seems to us an open question. In any case, the functioning of the 
intersubjective process clearly depends just as much on the characteristics of the 
community as on the rhetorical technique of judges that is the focus of Edlin and Kahn. 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 88–134. 
 31. Id. at 135–72. 
 32. Id. at 173–79. 
 33. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000). 
 34. Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, GREEN BAG, Spring 2005, at 9, available at 
http://www.greenbag.org/v8n3/v8n3_articles_tribe.pdf. Our thanks to Sanford Levinson who, in his foreword to 
our book Reason in Law, pointed to Tribe’s comments in considering the capacity of legal reasoning to bring 
communities together. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 16, at xi–xvi. 
 35. KAHN, supra note 2, at 28–30; Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc., 564 U.S. 786, 821–40 (2011) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 36. THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014). 
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